

The Onopticon and Ontopolitical Mutation: The Infrastructural Imposition of the Space of Possibility and the Right to Opacity

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“My paradigm is not a paradigm of truth; it is a paradigm of reality.”

Abstract

This article argues that contemporary digital power cannot be adequately understood through the established concepts of surveillance, discipline, control, or code-based regulation alone. Although the Panopticon, dispositif, societies of control, and the thesis that “code is law” remain indispensable for understanding the digital age, they are insufficient for grasping a specific qualitative threshold produced by contemporary technological integration. I name this threshold the ****Onopticon****.

The distinctive feature of the Onopticon is not merely visibility, behavioural modulation, or technical restriction. Rather, the concept names a regime of reality in which digital infrastructures pre-configure the future possibilities that are presented to the subject through data flows, predictive modelling, identity-verification systems, platform interfaces, and algorithmic thresholds of access. The Onopticon therefore marks a shift from the regulation of behaviour after the fact to the infrastructural organisation of the conditions of possibility before action.

The article repositions Plato’s distinction between truth and appearance, Aristotle’s concepts of telos and polis, Kant’s account of autonomy and the a priori conditions of experience, Marx’s analyses of capital, machinery, real subsumption and general intellect, Gramsci’s concepts of hegemony and common sense, Hegelian recognition, Althusserian interpellation, Husserlian lifeworld, and Heideggerian enframing in relation to the Onopticon. This repositioning is not an attack on the founding theoretical traditions. Rather, it is an objection to the displacement, by digital infrastructure, of the conditions of subjectivity, world, labour, recognition, ideology and experience that made those traditions operative.

The article also brings the Onopticon into confrontation with contemporary progressive technological paradigms: transhumanism, accelerationism, technological solutionism, and

democratic technological reformism. It argues that these paradigms continue to presuppose technology as an instrument of enhancement, emancipation, optimisation or participation, whereas the Onopticon shows that technology has become the infrastructural environment that determines the field within which agency can appear.

Finally, the article proposes the **Right to Opacity** not as a principle of data protection, a technical design recommendation, or a reformist policy programme, but as an ontological line of resistance against the reduction of the human subject to calculability. This right does not seek the improvement of the system; it rejects the system's claim to render the human subject entirely readable.

Keywords: Onopticon, ontopolitical mutation, Homovictimus, Right to Opacity, surplus-probability, onoptic subsumption, infrastructural common sense, synthetic lifeworld, ontological friction, algorithmic power, space of possibility, digital sovereignty, calculability, Panopticon, dispositif, societies of control, code is law, commodity fetishism, real subsumption, general intellect, hegemony, recognition, interpellation, lifeworld, enframing, transhumanism, accelerationism, technological solutionism, democratic technological reformism, Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Marx, Gramsci, Hegel, Althusser, Husserl, Heidegger, Stiegler, Foucault, Deleuze, Lessig

1. Introduction: From Surveillance to the Imposition of the Space of Possibility

Contemporary digital power is often discussed under the headings of privacy violation, data extraction, platform capitalism, surveillance society, or algorithmic discrimination. These discussions are indispensable, yet insufficient. Contemporary technological apparatuses do not merely observe individuals; they pre-configure the options they encounter, the services they may access, the spaces in which they become visible, the conditions under which they count as valid, and the world they experience.

The central claim of this article is that digital power is no longer merely a mechanism that observes or directs the subject; it has become a regime that technically pre-organises the field of possibilities the subject encounters. The question is therefore no longer simply "Who sees us?" The more fundamental question is: which technical architecture renders certain future possibilities producible, accessible and liveable as reality?

This regime is named here as the **Onopticon**. The Onopticon draws upon, but cannot be reduced to, the centralised surveillance logic of the Panopticon, the many-watching-many structure of the Synopticon, the diffuse visibility of the Omnopticon, or Deleuze's logic of modulation in

societies of control. Its decisive weight lies not in visibility as such, but in the predictive production of conditions of possibility.

In this context, **ontopolitical mutation** refers to the moment at which power no longer merely regulates the subject's behaviours, beliefs, or bodily movements, but begins to technically produce the conditions under which the subject encounters the world. The term mutation does not imply that all previous forms of power have disappeared. Rather, it indicates that discipline, control and code are now attached to a new threshold: they intervene not only in behaviour, but in the map of possibilities that precedes behaviour.

The novelty of the concept must be formulated carefully. The Onopticon is not a concept that enters a theoretical void. Marx showed that capital appropriates not only the products of labour but also the conditions of production, the machine system and social time (Marx, 1973; Marx, 1976). Bentham's Panopticon already organised space in order to pre-shape behaviour (Bentham, 1995). Foucault showed that disciplinary power productively organises bodies, time and space (Foucault, 1977). Deleuze announced the transition from enclosed disciplinary institutions to societies of continuous control and modulation (Deleuze, 1992). Lessig demonstrated that code functions as a form of regulation comparable to law (Lessig, 1999).

The contribution of the Onopticon is not to reject this lineage, but to name the qualitative form it assumes under contemporary digital infrastructure. This form consists of three interrelated elements: **real-time operation**, **predictive modelling**, and **infrastructural imposition**. The Onopticon does not merely record past behaviour; it calculates future behavioural possibilities and installs those calculations at the threshold of the subject's practical reality.

The method of this article is theoretical and conceptual. It does not present an empirical field study. Rather, it reorganises debates in social theory and the philosophy of technology in order to test the explanatory force of the Onopticon. To prevent the concept from remaining purely abstract, the article also examines three micro-operational fields: risk scoring, biometric verification, and platform interface design.

2. Theoretical Location: Marx, Panopticon, Dispositif, Control and Code

In order to make the Onopticon theoretically defensible, it is necessary to clarify the concepts with which it is affiliated and the points at which it diverges from them. The argument is not that the existing literature is wrong. Rather, it is that contemporary digital infrastructures require that this literature be reorganised around a new concept.

The issue is not that classical theories or contemporary progressive paradigms are intellectually weak. Nor is it that Marx, Hegel, Gramsci, Althusser, Husserl, or Heidegger were simply mistaken. The problem is more radical: the subject-world relation presupposed by these theories is being technically displaced by contemporary digital infrastructures. Classical theories explain the subject's relation to labour, recognition, ideology, experience, or Being; the Onopticon argues that the field within which such relations take place is now itself infrastructurally imposed before those relations can unfold. The founding traditions are therefore not rendered inoperative because the Onopticon attacks them, but because the historical ground on which they operated has been transformed by digital reality.

This reorganisation cannot be achieved without Marx. Yet placing Marx at the centre does not mean treating the other thinkers as auxiliary figures. The same reason applies to each of them: as long as the subject is still conceived primarily in terms of labour, recognition, ideology, experience, or technological disclosure, one risks missing the fact that the subject's field of possible encounters has already been infrastructurally organised. The infrastructural character of the Onopticon is therefore not merely a problem of surveillance or code; it is also a new form of the technical-material organisation of capital.

Bentham's Panopticon constructs surveillance not merely as a relation of sight, but as an architectural arrangement. The prisoner's behaviour is disciplined by the possibility of being seen (Bentham, 1995). Foucault extends this model into the general logic of modern disciplinary society: the school, the prison, the hospital, the barracks and the factory organise the body, time and conduct (Foucault, 1977). Power here does not merely prohibit; it produces, shapes and normalises.

Foucault's concept of *dispositif* is central because it shows that power operates not only through discourse, but through a composition of institutions, architecture, knowledge, techniques, administrative arrangements and practices (Foucault, 1980; Agamben, 2009). The Onopticon continues this line in the age of digital infrastructure, but understands it not simply as a heterogeneous ensemble of power elements, but as the real-time imposition of a space of possibilities.

Deleuze's account of societies of control describes the replacement of enclosed disciplinary institutions by open, flexible and continuously modulated forms of power (Deleuze, 1992). The individual no longer moves only through institutions, but through passwords, access codes, data flows and continuously updated evaluative mechanisms. This is one of the closest theoretical sources for the Onopticon.

Lessig's thesis that "code is law" is also a necessary threshold. Where law regulates behaviour through external norms, code determines the technical conditions of possible conduct (Lessig, 1999). An action not permitted by a platform is often, for the user, practically impossible. An

identity or transaction form not recognised by a protocol may become technically invalid even if it is legally legitimate.

Nevertheless, the Onopticon cannot be reduced either to Lessig's regulation by code or to Deleuze's societies of control. In the Onopticon, technical regulation does not merely determine the boundaries of behaviour; through data-based prediction, it constructs the possibilities that will confront the subject as reality. Control modulates access; the Onopticon imposes the possible prior to access. Code limits behaviour; the Onopticon constructs the map of the future before behaviour.

The claim to originality is therefore not that there is simply more surveillance or more intensive control. The claim is that the Onopticon produces **predictive imposition of possibility**. The subject's reality is no longer only the result of present actions, but also the result of the futures calculated about that subject.

3. Not Narrowing but Imposition: The Qualitative Difference of the Onopticon

The key feature that distinguishes the Onopticon from previous models of power is **real-time predictive imposition**. This concept contains three elements.

First, the Onopticon operates in real time. The Panopticon disciplines behaviour within a specific spatial arrangement. The society of control produces more fluid and continuous modulation. The Onopticon, however, positions the subject within continuous data flows through sensors, platform activity, location data, biometric verification, transaction histories and interaction traces. Decisions are not merely applied according to fixed rules; they are continuously recalibrated through updated data flows.

Second, the Onopticon is predictive. Surveillance records the past; control modulates present movement; the Onopticon calculates future behavioural possibilities. Risk scores, recommendation systems, credit assessments, fraud detection models, content-ranking algorithms and automated eligibility checks govern the subject not only as the subject is, but as the subject may become (Amoore, 2020; Pasquale, 2015; Rouvroy and Berns, 2013).

Third, the Onopticon is impositional. Imposition here does not mean that options are subsequently restricted. Restriction presupposes a pre-existing field of freedom that is then reduced. Imposition means that the field the subject will encounter is constructed in advance. The terror of the Onopticon is not that it reduces options, but that it determines the environment, visibility, validity conditions and predictive horizon within which options appear at all.

The basic formula of the Onopticon is therefore:

*data capture → predictive modelling → construction of the space of possibility →
production of behaviour → renewed data capture.*

This cycle distinguishes the Onopticon from surveillance or code-based regulation alone. The system does not passively wait after recording behaviour. It extracts future possibilities from behaviour, constructs the world the subject will encounter according to those possibilities, and then absorbs the behaviour produced by that construction as new data. Reality is thereby imposed within a feedback-based infrastructural regime of prediction.

The term “reality-constituting” does not mean that the system creates the physical world ex nihilo. More precisely, the Onopticon constructs the practical reality encountered by the subject: access, visibility, ranking, risk, validity conditions and possibilities. It is therefore not a metaphysical concept, but an ontopolitical one: it names the political-technical organisation of the conditions of existence.

4. Micro-Operational Lines: Scoring, Biometrics and Platform Interfaces

The operation of the Onopticon can be made concrete through three micro-operational lines: risk scoring, biometric verification and platform interfaces. Although these fields appear distinct, they share the same operational logic: the subject is first broken down into measurable inputs; these inputs are processed within a model or threshold; the subject’s field of access, visibility or movement is then technically constructed. The purpose of this section is not to provide an exhaustive empirical analysis, but to show the micro-technical thresholds at which the abstract claim of the Onopticon becomes material.

Risk scoring: binding the future to numerical thresholds

Risk-scoring systems offer one of the clearest examples of the predictive-impositional logic of the Onopticon. The subject is classified according to probable future behaviour on the basis of past conduct and associated data points. A score is not merely descriptive; it may become a threshold for access, credibility, credit, insurance, monitoring, or penal evaluation.

The COMPAS recidivism risk assessment tool is illustrative here. ProPublica’s public analysis showed that COMPAS risk scores were generated on a scale from 1 to 10, with scores 1–4 classified as “low”, 5–7 as “medium”, and 8–10 as “high” risk (Angwin et al., 2016). The crucial issue is not only whether the algorithm is fair or biased. The more fundamental issue is that the subject’s

possible future behaviour is translated into a numerical threshold and transported into institutional decision-making.

The Onopticon operates here at three levels. First, the subject's past is converted into a data set. Second, this data is translated into a probability concerning the future. Third, the resulting score becomes a validity threshold shaping institutional encounters. The individual is treated not only according to past behaviour, but according to the future calculated about them.

Credit-scoring systems operate through a similar logic. Payment histories, debt levels, transaction patterns and financial behaviour are not merely recorded; they are translated into a future profile of reliability. This profile can determine which credit products a person can access, at what interest rate, and under what conditions. The problem is not only being scored incorrectly. The deeper issue is that economic existence becomes tied to technical prediction systems (Eubanks, 2018; Pasquale, 2015).

Scoring in the Onopticon is therefore not merely classification. It is the institutional pre-processing of the future. The human subject encounters not only the visible consequences of their actions, but also a probability profile constructed by systems that are often difficult to inspect, contest, or escape.

Biometric verification: from similarity score to threshold of existence

Biometric verification systems show the transition from recognition to authentication. The subject is admitted not through juridical declaration or social identity, but through the face, fingerprint, iris, voice, gait pattern, or behavioural signature. Identity ceases to be merely a represented status; it becomes a data package that must be technically matched.

At the operational level, biometric systems often function through a similarity score and threshold logic. The system calculates the degree to which the presented biometric pattern corresponds to a stored record; a match above a given threshold is accepted, while a match below it is rejected. This threshold may appear to be a technical parameter, but within the Onopticon it becomes a threshold of existence. If the threshold is not crossed, the subject may continue to exist legally while becoming invalid for the system.

Research on facial recognition systems shows that such thresholds are not neutral. The Gender Shades study demonstrated that commercial facial analysis systems could produce significantly higher error rates for darker-skinned women (Buolamwini and Gebru, 2018). NIST's report on demographic effects in facial recognition likewise documented measurable performance differentials in contemporary face recognition algorithms (Grother, Ngan and Hanaoka, 2019). From the standpoint of the Onopticon, these findings do not concern only algorithmic bias; they show how technical thresholds determine who is smoothly recognised by the system and who is suspended.

Biometrics therefore does not merely render the body visible; it turns the body into an access key. The human ceases to be a subject who narrates their identity and becomes an object of verification that must be matched by the technical infrastructure. False negatives, sensor incompatibilities, or database errors can push an individual outside the service field. The subject counts as valid only insofar as the system can read them.

Platform interfaces: friction, default settings and the choreography of choice

Platform interfaces constitute the most ordinary, but also one of the most pervasive, forms of the Onopticon. The user appears to choose freely in a social media feed, search engine, shopping platform, or recommendation system. Yet the options presented, rankings, default settings, recommendations, visibility thresholds and clickable paths have already been designed.

At the level of interface design, the Onopticon often operates not through prohibition, but through the distribution of friction. Some actions are made possible with a single click; others require additional steps, less visible buttons, ambiguous wording, delays, or discouraging flows. This does not merely narrow options after the fact; it constructs the path along which choice will take place.

The literature on dark patterns renders this level operationally visible. Mathur and colleagues' study of approximately 11,000 shopping websites identified numerous interface patterns designed to steer users towards purchasing more or disclosing more information (Mathur et al., 2019). These patterns are not simply manipulative techniques; they reveal the capacity of the interface to choreograph behavioural possibilities in advance.

Here the technical threshold is neither a risk score nor a biometric similarity score, but clickability, visibility, default configuration and transaction cost. The user still chooses, but choice takes place along a path structured by the interface. The platform interface converts past data into future behavioural possibilities and returns those possibilities to the user as reality.

Taken together, these three micro-operational lines show that the Onopticon is not merely a matter of credit, identity, or platforms. Its common logic is the calculation of the subject's space of possibility through technical thresholds and the return of that calculation as the world the subject encounters.

5. Ancient and Modern Thresholds: Plato, Aristotle and Kant as Displaced Grounds

The Onopticon's engagement with classical theory is not limited to modern sociology or political economy. Its deeper claim is that some of the most fundamental assumptions of Western thought concerning subject, truth, purpose and experience are displaced in the age of digital infrastructure. Plato, Aristotle and Kant are therefore not historical ornaments in this argument, but necessary thresholds for showing which philosophical grounds are rendered inoperative by the paradigm of reality.

This section does not attempt to summarise Platonic metaphysics, Aristotelian teleology, or Kantian transcendental philosophy in their entirety. Its aim is narrower and sharper: to show which basic philosophical assumptions the Onopticon renders problematic. Each thinker is therefore addressed through a single focus: Plato through the distinction between truth and appearance; Aristotle through the horizon of telos and polis; Kant through autonomy and the conditions of possibility of experience.

In Plato, the focus here is the distinction between appearance and truth. In the allegory of the cave, the subject mistakes shadows for reality; the philosophical movement is an ascent from the world of appearances towards the realm of truth. The Onopticon does not simply negate this Platonic distinction; it inverts and reconfigures it. The problem is no longer merely that the subject mistakes shadows for truth. The problem is that the infrastructure pre-organises which shadows will appear, in which sequence, and which possibilities will be experienced as truth.

The Onopticon is therefore not an ordinary regime of illusion projecting new images onto the wall of the cave. It is an infrastructure that technically organises the architecture of the cave, the direction of light, the order of shadows, the subject's angle of vision and the possibility of exit. In Plato, liberation is the movement from appearance to truth; in the Onopticon, even the route towards truth is pre-arranged by interfaces, scores, visibility thresholds and algorithmic rankings. The desire for truth does not disappear, but the ground of orientation towards truth is synthesised.

For Aristotle, the decisive focus here is the relation between telos and polis. Being, purpose, movement and actualisation are thought through the concept of telos. The human is not merely a biological organism, but a being endowed with logos who seeks the good life within the polis. Action, character, virtue and common life concern the realisation of the human towards its proper end. The Onopticon interrupts this teleological ground. The subject's movement towards its telos no longer takes place within an open world of the polis, but within technically constructed thresholds of option and access.

The problem in the age of the Onopticon is therefore not merely that the human cannot live virtuously. It is that the field within which virtue, choice, purpose or the common good may be sought is infrastructurally pre-configured. The polis gives way to the platformised public sphere; citizenship to verifiable access; practical reason to directed fields of choice. In the Aristotelian

sense, the human subject's realisation towards its telos becomes possible only within the possibilities recognised by technical systems. Telos becomes not only an ethical-political horizon, but a corridor of possibility shaped by infrastructure.

Kant constitutes the most critical modern threshold for the Onopticon, especially with respect to the conditions of possibility of experience and the problem of autonomy. The Kantian subject is not a passive recipient of objective conditions of experience, but the transcendental subject that provides the formal conditions of experience. Time, space and the categories are the conditions of possibility of experience. At the moral level, the Kantian subject is an autonomous rational being capable of giving the law to itself.

The radical force of the Onopticon becomes visible precisely here. The conditions of experience are no longer located only in the formal structure of the transcendental subject; they are also organised through external yet internalised technical infrastructures. This does not mean that Kant is simply refuted. The stronger claim is that the field in which the Kantian subject is thought to organise experience is pre-structured by technical systems. The search engine, platform feed, verification protocol, biometric threshold, credit score, or recommendation system shapes the visibility and accessibility conditions of the objects the subject encounters.

The algorithmic a priori does not simply replace the Kantian a priori. Rather, transcendental conditions and technical conditions become entangled. The Onopticon directly affects the Kantian ground because it organises not merely empirical content, but the conditions of encounter. Kantian moral autonomy is also placed under pressure. Autonomy is the capacity of the subject to give the law to itself. Yet in the Onopticon the subject often does not determine which options it will encounter, which access paths it must pass through, or which futures will appear possible. The subject may choose, but the field of choice is already constructed.

Plato, Aristotle and Kant should therefore not be read as great thinkers simply "surpassed" by the Onopticon. Rather, they represent three displaced philosophical grounds: orientation towards truth, teleological actualisation, and autonomous constitution of experience. The Onopticon intervenes in all three for the same reason: it technically constructs in advance the field within which the subject's relation to truth, purpose and experience will take place. The Onopticon's objection to classical philosophy is therefore not an attack, but a diagnosis of loss. Truth, telos and autonomy remain philosophically indispensable; yet the open world in which they could operate is not narrowed, but imposed in advance, by digital infrastructures.

6. Marx: From Commodity to Space of Possibility, from Real Subsumption to Onoptic Subsumption

The theoretical architecture of the Onopticon cannot be completed without Marx. Marx shows that modern power operates not only in juridical, ideological, or political forms, but within the material organisation of the mode of production. Capital, for Marx, is not merely the accumulation of wealth; it is an abstract and material force that reorganises social relations according to its own logic of valorisation (Marx, 1976). The Onopticon's claim concerning infrastructural imposition can therefore be read as an expanded form of Marx's analysis of capital in the digital age.

Marx's analysis of commodity fetishism describes the way in which social relations take the form of relations between things. Relations of labour, dependence and domination between humans appear in the market as if they were natural relations between objects (Marx, 1976). In the Onopticon, this fetishism assumes a new form: social relations appear not only as commodities, but as scores, profiles, data points, risk categories and algorithmic predictions. The human subject confronts not only the objectified products of social relations, but also the calculable traces of their own existence.

The Onopticon is therefore a digital extension of commodity fetishism, but not reducible to it. Commodity fetishism presents social labour as though it were a natural relation between things; the Onopticon presents social futures as though they were natural outcomes of algorithmic probabilities. A credit score, risk profile, recommendation system, or biometric match appears as a neutral technical result. Yet these are products of particular data regimes, classificatory logics and infrastructural relations of power.

Marx's concept of real subsumption is even more important here. In formal subsumption, capital takes control of an existing labour process. In real subsumption, it technically, organisationally and temporally reorganises the labour process itself (Marx, 1976). The Onopticon extends this logic from production to life. It is no longer only labour that is reorganised, but choice, attention, movement, relation, access, visibility and future possibility.

The Onopticon therefore names a new stage that may be called ****onoptic subsumption****. If real subsumption is the technical reorganisation of labour by capital, onoptic subsumption is the reorganisation of the lifeworld as a space of possibility. Capital now binds not only the worker's labour time, but also the user's attention, the citizen's access, the consumer's horizon of preference, the body's verifiability and the future's predictability to its infrastructural logic.

Marx's discussion of the "general intellect" in the Grundrisse is also central. The machine system allows social knowledge and collective intelligence to become productive forces (Marx, 1973). In the digital age, however, the general intellect becomes not only productive capacity, but predictive infrastructure. Social knowledge accumulates in databases, models, networks and algorithmic

systems; it then returns to the subject as access, score, recommendation, verification and risk.

At this point, the concept of **surplus-probability** emerges. Surplus-value concerns the production by labour-power of more value than its own value. Surplus-probability, by contrast, concerns the transformation of human behaviour, attention traces, location movements, biometric data, preferences and deviations into the system's capacity to calculate the future. The Onopticon does not merely extract economic value from present behaviour; it produces governable futures from that behaviour. In other words, the human subject produces not only goods or data, but the probabilistic raw material through which the system can construct the future on their behalf.

Surplus-probability is not simply the digital equivalent of surplus-value. Whereas surplus-value is a category of economic exploitation realised in the labour process, surplus-probability is a capacity of predictive domination extracted from the uncertainty of life. A platform produces value not only from a user's present click, but from the capacity to calculate what that user may orient towards tomorrow. A credit system produces power not only from past payments, but from the classification of probable future conduct. A biometric infrastructure produces power not only from identifiable bodily traces, but from turning the body into a condition of access.

Homovictimus is therefore not simply a new class figure replacing the classical proletariat. More precisely, Homovictimus is the digital-infrastructure extension of the proletarian condition. The proletarian was separated from the means of production; Homovictimus is separated from the production of its own space of possibility. It supplies the raw material for predictions about its own future, but cannot determine which reality those predictions will impose.

Marx's concept of alienation also gains a new dimension here. In classical alienation, the worker is alienated from the product of labour, the labour process, species-being and other humans (Marx, 1988). In the Onopticon, the subject becomes alienated from their data double and algorithmic future. The system produces a profile about the subject; the subject then encounters the access conditions determined by that profile. The human subject is weakened before the data he or she has produced and the future inferred from that data.

The Onopticon therefore does not invalidate Marx. On the contrary, it intensifies Marx's analysis of capital at the level of digital infrastructure. Yet it also exceeds Marx's classical production-centred framework. Exploitation now operates not only in labour time, but in experiential time; not only in the factory, but on the platform; not only in the production process, but in the construction of the space of possibility. Capital no longer merely commodifies the world; it imposes the possible forms in which the world can appear to the subject.

7. Gramsci: From Hegemony to Infrastructural Common Sense

Marx is necessary for grasping the capital and infrastructure dimension of the Onopticon, but Gramsci is equally important for explaining its everyday acceptability. Gramsci's concept of hegemony shows that power operates not only through coercion, but through consent, common sense, cultural leadership and everyday worlds of meaning (Gramsci, 1971). This is a critical threshold for the Onopticon: digital infrastructure is not merely imposed; it is often accepted because it appears "natural", "inevitable", "practical" and "smart".

For Gramsci, hegemony differs from naked domination because people begin to understand the world through the concepts of a given order. In the Onopticon this takes the form of **infrastructural common sense**. Logging into a platform, verifying identity, sharing location, providing biometric data, following recommendation systems, or being evaluated by scores begins to appear ordinary. Power is no longer merely external pressure; it becomes the technical common sense of everyday reality.

The Onopticon therefore transfers the Gramscian concept of hegemony from the cultural to the infrastructural level. Hegemony is no longer produced only in the school, the press, the party, the family, or institutions of civil society; it is also produced in the interface, protocol, default setting, verification screen, notification order and access condition. The user often participates not because they have been persuaded by an ideology, but because they cannot complete the operation otherwise. Yet as this necessity is repeated, it becomes common sense.

Gramsci's concept of the "historical bloc" can also be re-read here. The historical bloc describes the articulation of material forces, institutions, ideas and cultural forms within a hegemonic totality (Gramsci, 1971). The Onopticon is the technical-historical bloc of the digital age: capital, state, platform, data infrastructure, security discourse, promises of convenience and the ideology of personalisation converge in the same regime of reality.

This bloc appears concretely in the implicit or explicit alliances between platform companies and states in the fields of data, security, identity verification, public service and behavioural prediction. Security discourse legitimates the collection of more data; efficiency discourse normalises the migration of public services into digital identity systems and platform interfaces; the promise of personalisation makes the continuous production of traces appear as voluntary convenience. Data collection thus appears not merely as a market interest or a state desire for control, but as the normal condition of everyday life.

The historical bloc of the Onopticon is therefore not merely a class alliance or ideological domination in the classical sense. It is the convergence of technical infrastructure, economic valorisation, security rationality and everyday convenience in the production of the same space of

possibility. This bloc imposes not only what the subject should think, but the possibilities within which the subject can think and act.

Consent is also transformed. In the Onopticon, consent often appears less as explicit agreement than as operational dependence. Accepting terms of service without reading them, using biometric access, following the path recommended by the platform, or passing through digital identity verification to access a public service is not free consent in the classical sense. It is infrastructural necessity appearing as consent.

Gramsci therefore shows that the Onopticon is not only coercion or technical imposition; it also becomes established as everyday common sense. Gramsci is placed immediately after Marx deliberately: Marx explains the infrastructural logic of capital; Gramsci explains how this logic becomes consent and common sense. Yet the Onopticon also exceeds Gramsci, because hegemony here does not only organise the world of meaning; it organises the conditions of access and reality. Older hegemony governed how the world was interpreted; infrastructural hegemony determines the form in which the world can be encountered.

The Right to Opacity is therefore not merely the production of a Gramscian counter-hegemony. Counter-hegemony still struggles within the field of meaning; opacity draws a limit at the level of compulsory readability that precedes meaning. The common sense of the Onopticon says: to be readable is normal. The Right to Opacity refuses this common sense: there is an excess in the human that cannot be read, calculated, or consumed in advance by the system.

8. Overcoming the Philosophical Canon: Recognition, Interpellation, Lifeworld and Enframing

After Marx and Gramsci have established the dimensions of capital, infrastructure, hegemony and common sense, four key lines of the philosophical canon must be repositioned: Hegelian recognition, Althusserian interpellation, Husserlian lifeworld and Heideggerian enframing. This section is not an encyclopaedic summary of these thinkers. It is an attempt to show the threshold reached by their concepts in the face of the Onopticon.

The tone of this synthesis is not attack, but protest. The Onopticon does not devalue Hegel, Althusser, Husserl, or Heidegger; rather, it protests the seizure by digital infrastructure of the historical and ontological conditions in which their concepts could operate. Recognition, interpellation, lifeworld and enframing remain important. Yet the field within which these relations appear is no longer encountered by the subject as an open world. The world increasingly appears already constructed by technical thresholds, authentication, scores, interfaces and predictive

regimes.

From recognition to authentication: repositioning the Hegelian framework

In Hegelian thought, the subject constitutes itself through relations of recognition with another consciousness. The master-slave dialectic is the most familiar scene of this struggle, but Hegel's thought is not reducible to it. The sphere of objective spirit, law, morality and institutions shows that recognition operates not only interpersonally, but institutionally (Hegel, 1977; Hegel, 1991). Contemporary theories of recognition have also reworked the Hegelian inheritance through social institutions, normative orders and relations of social esteem (Honneth, 1995).

The Onopticon does not simply invalidate Hegelian recognition. The more precise question is: how is the relation of recognition transformed within technical systems of authentication?

In the Onopticon, the subject does not encounter only another consciousness, a master, or a normative institution. The subject encounters databases, identity-verification systems, algorithmic scores, platform protocols and thresholds of access. Recognition is not abolished, but is tied to the conditions of technical authentication.

****Recognition**** is symbolic, normative and reciprocal. ****Authentication**** is asymmetric, technical and operational. A subject who is not recognised may still contest, demand visibility and enter normative struggle. A subject who is not authenticated often cannot enter the system at all. In the Onopticon, political existence is increasingly attached to technical validity.

This transformation does not abolish the Hegelian dialectic, but changes the ground on which it operates. Conflict still exists, but it can be platformised, scored, simulated and converted into manageable data flows. The struggle for recognition is thereby reconfigured within regimes of authentication.

The issue is not only that the subject is not recognised. It is that the subject must first enter a format readable by the system in order to be recognised. Homovictimus is the subject forced to conduct the struggle for recognition through the gate of technical authentication.

From interpellation to compatibility: the infrastructuralisation of Althusserian ideology

Althusser's concept of ideological interpellation explains how individuals are positioned as subjects by Ideological State Apparatuses. Yet ideology for Althusser is not merely discursive. Ideology exists in practices, rituals, institutions and material apparatuses (Althusser, 1971). It would therefore be mistaken to exclude digital interfaces, protocols and platform habits from an Althusserian frame.

The Onopticon's claim in relation to Althusser must therefore be formulated carefully: the Onopticon does not abolish ideological interpellation; it infrastructuralises it. Ideology no longer operates only by symbolically calling the individual into a subject-position. It also technically organises which actions are easy, which options appear, which paths are imposed and which behaviours are treated as default.

In Althusserian interpellation, the subject becomes a subject by responding to the call. In the Onopticon, compatibility often precedes the call. To enter the system, the individual must conform to specific data formats, identity-verification mechanisms, terms of use, device standards and platform protocols.

Ideology therefore does not disappear in the Onopticon; it is embedded in interfaces, code, default settings and compulsory modes of use. Classical ideology tells the individual what to believe; infrastructuralised ideology determines which options the individual will encounter.

This distinction matters. One can disbelieve an ideology; but when public services, banking, healthcare, education, transport and communication infrastructures are tied to technical systems, refusing compatibility becomes costly. The power of the Onopticon lies less in persuasion than in indispensability.

Synthetic lifeworld: the possibility and limit of Husserlian phenomenology

Husserl's concept of the lifeworld names the pre-theoretical world of immediate experience that precedes and grounds scientific abstraction. Phenomenological bracketing makes it possible to question structures that are taken as natural (Husserl, 1970). For this reason, Husserl is not merely a thinker to be surpassed by the Onopticon; he is a crucial starting point for interrogating technical naturalisation.

Yet in the contemporary digital environment, the lifeworld can no longer be thought of as a pure realm outside technical infrastructure. This does not reject Husserl's concept of the lifeworld; it subjects it to a harsher question in the digital age. For Husserl, the lifeworld is the horizon that precedes and grounds scientific abstractions. In the Onopticon, scientific-technical abstractions do not remain merely external, post-hoc explanations; they enter experience in advance through search rankings, recommendation systems, platform visibility, location-based services, authentication protocols and personalisation infrastructures. It is therefore necessary to speak of a ****synthetic lifeworld****.

The synthetic lifeworld is the world the subject believes it experiences directly, but which is continuously reorganised by algorithmic selection, ranking, filtering and personalisation. Experience does not disappear; rather, the horizon of experience is technically organised. More precisely, the Onopticon does not destroy the lifeworld; it synthesises it in fields of high

infrastructural dependence. What the subject experiences, when, in which order and in which context, is increasingly determined not by the contingency of organic encounters, but by architectures of technical exposure.

At this point, phenomenological bracketing becomes newly functional for the critique of the Onopticon. What must be bracketed is no longer only the claim of scientific objectivity, but the presentation of technical infrastructure as a natural, neutral and inevitable environment of experience. In the age of the Onopticon, phenomenological reduction asks: which interface, ranking, verification process, data flow, or infrastructural threshold made this world appear to me in this way? Husserl is therefore not simply surpassed by the Onopticon, but rearmed as a method for interrogating technical naturalisation.

Intentionality is also transformed. In classical phenomenology, consciousness is directed towards its object. In the Onopticon, consciousness still intends, but the objects, possibilities and affective intensities it encounters have already passed through technical processes. Intentionality is not destroyed; its horizon is architecturally organised.

From enframing to imposition: Heidegger, Stiegler and technical pharmacology

Heidegger thinks technology not as a merely instrumental phenomenon, but as an ontological ordering that determines how Being is disclosed. The essence of modern technology is *Ge-stell*, enframing: the revealing of beings as calculable and available standing-reserve (Heidegger, 1977). Heidegger is therefore one of the strongest sources for understanding the ontopolitical dimension of the Onopticon.

There is a clear affinity between the Onopticon and *Ge-stell*. In both, technology ceases to be an external tool and becomes a structure determining how the world appears and how the human relates to it. The Onopticon also organises the human subject as a producer of data, a modelable behaviour, a verifiable access point and an element whose predictability can be increased.

Yet the Onopticon requires that Heideggerian enframing be rethought in the operational intensity of contemporary digital infrastructures. What is at stake is not only the disclosure of beings as calculable standing-reserve, but the continuous organisation of everyday reality by platforms, networks, databases, sensors and algorithms. The Onopticon may therefore be understood as the digital-infrastructural and predictive form of enframing.

Stiegler's technical pharmacology offers an important extension. Technics is not only poison, but also remedy; it can lead to destruction, but can also produce new forms of memory, attention, collectivity and resistance (Stiegler, 1998). The concept of the Onopticon therefore does not reject technology as such. Its target is not the technical, but the form of sovereignty that binds technical infrastructure to compulsory readability and predictive calculability.

This distinction is crucial. The critique of the Onopticon is not a romantic anti-technological gesture. The problem is not the existence of technology, but the logic of power within which technology is organised. However, this article does not offer a reformist programme for improving that logic. The depth of the Onopticon prevents it from being treated merely as a technical risk to be better managed. The issue is not to correct the system's defects, but to refuse its claim to render the human subject entirely readable.

9. Collision with Progressive Paradigms: Enhancement, Acceleration, Optimisation and the Illusion of Participation

The Onopticon conflicts not only with classical theories of surveillance and discipline, but also with contemporary progressive paradigms that view technology as emancipation, development, or transcendence. Transhumanism, accelerationism, technological solutionism and democratic technological reformism differ in many respects, yet share a basic assumption: if properly used, technology can expand human agency, solve social problems, or accelerate the transition beyond the present order. The Onopticon reverses this assumption. The issue is not that technology is too slow, incomplete, or badly managed; the issue is that technological infrastructure has begun to impose the conditions under which the human encounters reality.

The collision between the Onopticon and progressive paradigms is therefore not merely a claim to have surpassed great thinkers or powerful theories. The issue is not the prestige of persons, traditions, or theoretical systems; the ontological level of the debate has changed. Progressive paradigms still assume technology as an instrument that humans can use, accelerate, democratise, or mobilise in order to surpass themselves. The Onopticon invalidates this assumption at the point of departure: if the world, options and future possibilities encountered by the subject are pre-constructed by technical infrastructure, then technology is no longer an instrument in the hands of the subject, but the environment that determines the field in which subjectivity can appear. The confrontation with the progressive tradition therefore becomes almost automatic, because its promise of emancipation rests on an older model of agency in which the subject can use technology from the outside.

Against transhumanism: Homovictimus

Transhumanism argues that the biological limits of the human can be overcome through technology. Body, mind, memory, attention and lifespan can be expanded by technical intervention; human-machine integration is often treated as the next evolutionary threshold of the species (Bostrom, 2005; Kurzweil, 2005). Biometric systems, neural interfaces, algorithmic prostheses and

data-integrated bodies are frequently interpreted as augmentation.

The Onopticon reverses this narrative of enhancement. Human-machine integration does not necessarily produce liberation; in many cases it makes the human more readable, measurable and predictable for the system. The attachment of the body to data flows may function less as an overcoming of biological limits than as a transformation of the body into an object of continuous verification and scoring.

Against the transhumanist figure of the enhanced human, the Onopticon posits ****Homovictimus****. Homovictimus is not a technologically upgraded super-subject, but a fragile agent compelled into calculability, from pulse and face to attention, preference, movement and cognitive trace. The problem is not technological articulation as such, but the sovereign form through which articulation delivers the human to infrastructural readability.

Against accelerationism: infrastructural imposition

Accelerationism argues that capitalism and technological automation must be driven to their limits, whether as rupture, post-capitalist transition, or post-human dissolution (Land, 2011; Srnicek and Williams, 2015). In left accelerationism in particular, algorithmic planning, automation and technological capacity are treated as means for overcoming scarcity and capitalist limitation.

From the standpoint of the Onopticon, the idea of acceleration is structurally problematic. What accelerates is not only productive capacity, computational power, or automation; the capacity to impose a space of possibility accelerates as well. As real-time data flows, predictive modelling and networked infrastructures accelerate, the reality that the subject encounters can be constructed more rapidly.

Acceleration therefore risks not emancipation but ontological closure. Speed does not produce liberation in itself. An accelerated infrastructure may not open the human future more rapidly; it may enable the system to calculate and impose the future on behalf of the human more rapidly. Accelerationism proposes moving to the limit of the system; the Onopticon shows that the limit is no longer a wall outside the human, but an infrastructure embedded in neural, cognitive and social horizons.

Against technological solutionism: the Right to Opacity

Technological solutionism tends to treat social problems as solvable through data, sensors, algorithms and optimisation. Smart cities, data-driven governance, behavioural prediction and frictionless service design are presented as tools for reducing crime, traffic, poverty, inefficiency, or disorder (Morozov, 2013; Pentland, 2014).

The Onopticon reads this ideal of frictionlessness from the opposite direction. A frictionless society does not only mean greater efficiency; it also means the removal of deviation, uncertainty, unexpected behaviour and incalculable excess from the system. Frictionlessness is the ideal not of the human, but of the infrastructure.

The Right to Opacity should therefore be understood as a right to friction against technological solutionism. Opacity is the right to frustrate prediction, to refuse full explanation, to withhold behaviour from data flows, and not to be reduced to an optimisable object. Human existence cannot be collapsed into a variable to be optimised like traffic flow or energy consumption. Against the Onopticon, opacity is not inefficiency; it is the excess of the human that cannot be consumed by the system.

Against democratic technological reformism: infrastructural sovereignty

Democratic technological approaches argue that technology is not neutral, that it is socially constructed, and that it can therefore be redesigned in more participatory, pluralistic, or ethical ways (Feenberg, 1999). This approach is valuable insofar as it shows that technical systems are not independent of social power relations. However, from the standpoint of the Onopticon it remains limited.

The problem in the Onopticon is not only who designs technology or according to which ethical principles it is governed. The problem is that the system requires readability as a condition of existence. A scoring system that is designed more participatorily does not abolish the logic of scoring. A more inclusive biometric system does not resolve the problem that existence is tied to technical verification. A more ethical platform interface does not abolish the fact that the subject's space of possibility is constructed by the interface.

The Onopticon therefore does not treat democratic technological reformism as worthless, but refuses to accept it as the final answer. Participation, ethics boards and inclusive design cannot address the ontological level at which the human is compelled into calculability. The fundamental line against the Onopticon is not to demand that the system calculate more fairly, but to draw a limit to the reduction of the human to an object of calculation.

The teleological collapse of progressivism

These four paradigms diverge in many directions, yet they share a teleological belief: technology, at the right speed, with the right design, or under the right governance, can expand the human horizon. The Onopticon rejects this belief. In contemporary infrastructural reality, technology is no longer merely an instrument used by humans; it is the environment that constructs and imposes the field of reality the human encounters.

The same reason applies both to classical subject-centred theories and to progressive technological paradigms. The former attempt to explain the subject's relation to the world; the latter presuppose that the subject can use technology to transcend itself or society. The Onopticon disrupts the common ground of both: if the world the subject encounters is infrastructurally constructed before the subject acts, then neither the classical subject-world relation nor the progressive technology-emancipation relation can persist in the same form.

The Onopticon therefore reverses the question asked by progressive paradigms. The issue is not where technology will take us, but in which space of possibility technological infrastructure has already placed us. Transhumanism speaks of enhancement; the Onopticon shows reduction. Accelerationism speaks of speed; the Onopticon shows the acceleration of imposition. Technological solutionism speaks of optimisation; the Onopticon shows the conversion of the human into an optimisable object. Democratic technological reformism speaks of participation; the Onopticon shows the conversion of readability into a condition of existence.

This collision makes the Right to Opacity even more central. Opacity is not the design of a better future within the progressive technological horizon. It is the insistence that the human remain incalculable against the system's attempt to calculate and impose the future in advance.

10. Homovictimus: The Agent of Victimhood, the Fragility of Agency

The subject produced by the Onopticon is **Homovictimus**. The concept names not only the fact that the human is made into a victim, but that victimhood itself becomes technically calculable. Homovictimus does not mean a passive or helpless subject. More precisely, Homovictimus is a fragile agent rendered continuously readable, predictable and directable by technical systems. This fragility, however, is not homogeneous. Not every digital user is Homovictimus to the same degree. The analytic value of the concept lies not in naming digital participation as a general condition of victimhood, but in identifying the structural production of vulnerability at specific thresholds.

The emphasis on victimhood must be retained. The concept does not claim that the subject lacks agency entirely, but that agency has been infrastructurally wounded. Homovictimus can still act, yet must act within an environment that is pre-scored, authenticated, ranked and risk-assessed. It is not that the subject is not an agent because it is a victim; rather, it becomes victimised precisely because its agency must constantly struggle against calculability.

Homovictimus must therefore be understood not as a universal and flat category of subjectivity, but as a **graded position of vulnerability**. At least six parameters determine the intensity of this

vulnerability: the practical necessity of entering the system; the ineffectiveness of offline or alternative channels; the obligation to produce continuous data, performance, or attention inputs; the attachment of such inputs to classificatory and decision-making processes; the limited capacity for appeal and correction; and the material or legal cost of exit. Where these parameters are weak, there is digital mediation or technical facilitation. Where they are strong, the threshold of Homovictimus is crossed.

This distinction makes visible the unequal distribution of vulnerability. A bank customer, an asylum seeker, a disabled person, a platform worker and an ordinary social media user are not Homovictimus in the same way. The bank customer is rendered vulnerable through financial access and creditworthiness; the asylum seeker through identity, border, aid and legal status thresholds; the disabled person through accessibility, biometric incompatibility, or dependence on digital public services; the platform worker through visibility, rating, account suspension and income infrastructure. What is common is not the type of victimisation, but the operationalisation of agency within technical thresholds.

This is also why “Homovictimus” cannot be replaced simply by terms such as “infrastructurally enclosed agent” or “calculable subject”. Such alternatives name technical enclosure, but weaken the damage, dependence and asymmetry produced by that enclosure. Homovictimus acknowledges that the agent still acts, but insists that this action does not take place under equal or neutral conditions. The hardness of the concept lies here: the subject has not disappeared, but has been systematically wounded.

This distinction is crucial for understanding digital practices of resistance. Hacktivism, data strikes, encryption practices, anonymous networks, counter-surveillance tools and demands for algorithmic accountability show that Homovictimus is not merely passive. Such practices attempt to interrupt, delay, or deform the regime of readability imposed by the system.

Yet these forms of resistance do not automatically abolish the structural power of the Onopticon. They often depend on the technical knowledge, devices, networks and legal limits of the very system they contest. A data strike attempts to disrupt the system by refusing data production; but when access to essential services is tied to data production, the cost of refusal is unequally distributed. Encryption can provide individual and collective privacy; but where access to encryption infrastructure is unequal, opacity can become a class privilege. Anonymous networks may provide invisibility, but invisibility does not always mean secure access.

Homovictimus is therefore neither pure victim nor free digital agent. It is a fragile subject compelled into calculability yet attempting to open cracks within calculability. The political value of the concept lies precisely here: it makes victimhood visible without reducing it to passivity.

11. The Right to Opacity: Not a Solution, but a Line of Incalculability

Resistance to the Onopticon cannot be reduced to the protection of privacy. Privacy is often understood as control over, or concealment of, personal data. The problem of the Onopticon is deeper: the human subject is compelled to become continuously readable, calculable and predictable.

This article therefore proposes the **Right to Opacity** as a fundamental existential and political right. This right should not be understood as a data protection right granted by a liberal legal order. The Right to Opacity is a negative ontological boundary against the system's claim to render the human subject entirely readable. This boundary precedes the demand "calculate me more fairly". The problem is not only that calculation is performed wrongly, but that the human subject is transformed into an object of calculation.

The Right to Opacity is therefore not a programme of solutions. It does not offer a recipe for living better within the Onopticon. Rather, it rejects the basic assumption that the human subject can be rendered fully intelligible, predictable and governable through sufficient data, modelling and computational power.

Opacity does not mean hiding in darkness or evading responsibility. It defends the irreducibility of human existence. The human subject is not the sum of its data. The human subject cannot be reduced to behavioural patterns, scores, biometric traces, consumption habits, or platform movements. The Right to Opacity establishes this irreducibility not merely as a political demand, but as an ontological threshold.

This threshold operates at three levels.

First, **cognitive opacity**. Human consciousness cannot be reduced to preference, attention, affect, or behavioural data. From a phenomenological standpoint, consciousness is an openness towards the world whose intentionality can never be fully surrendered to externally measurable indicators (Husserl, 1970; Merleau-Ponty, 2012). The Onopticon can measure attention span, click rhythm, eye movement, or affective response; but these measurements cannot exhaust the excess through which consciousness creates meaning. Cognitive opacity insists that the mind always exceeds the system's predictive model.

Second, **bodily opacity**. The body is not exhausted by the traces readable by biometric verification. Face, fingerprint, voice, iris, or movement pattern do not exhaust identity. The body is not merely a data surface to be identified; it is a field of vulnerability, gendering, memory, desire,

pain, resistance and social contact. Feminist and post-structuralist theories of the body show that the body is never merely a biological object or technical signal carrier; it is formed by norms, yet never reducible to them (Butler, 1993; Grosz, 1994). Bodily opacity names the inability of biometric readability to exhaust the existential density of the body.

Third, **“existential opacity”**. The human subject is not condemned to the probable future calculated from past data. The Onopticon attempts to construct the subject as a risk profile, credit probability, behavioural prediction, or platform tendency; yet the human subject cannot be reduced to its algorithmic future. Existential opacity defends the openness that exceeds the probability profile constructed by the system. The human subject is not merely a future inferred from past traces; it is the capacity for unexpected decision, deviation, refusal, silence, redirection and renewed meaning.

The Right to Opacity therefore cannot be reduced to making technical systems more transparent, more ethical, or more inclusive. Such a reduction would turn the radical diagnosis of the Onopticon into a manageable administrative problem. The issue is not bad design, but the compulsion of the human subject into calculability.

At the everyday level, the Right to Opacity appears not as a fantasy of total withdrawal from the system, but as the capacity to produce **“ontological friction”**. Such friction appears in contesting the conversion of biometric verification into the sole threshold of existence; interrupting the rapid consent flows imposed by dark patterns; refusing the platform’s expectation of explanation, sharing, location disclosure and constant availability; and, where possible, remaining silent, slowing down, leaving fewer traces, refusing single-channel authentication and disrupting calculable behavioural rhythms. These are not policy programmes, but micro-lines of resistance opened by Homovictimus within its fragile agency. The Onopticon demands continuity; opacity introduces interruption.

Transparency, oversight, or technical safeguards are not meaningless at the practical level. Yet they cannot be the central answer. The Onopticon is not a defective system, but a regime that imposes reality. The aim is therefore not to make the system function better, but to draw a limit to its claim to make the human entirely operable, measurable and predictable.

The Right to Opacity rests on the following proposition:

The human subject is not identical with what the system can calculate; therefore, the right to remain incalculable precedes any regime of technical compatibility.

This right is a negative resistance rather than a positive programme. It does not build an institution; it draws a boundary. It does not offer a policy package; it formulates a refusal. Against the space of possibility imposed by the Onopticon, it defends the excess of the human that cannot be consumed in advance by the system.

12. Conclusion: Diagnosis Rather than Regulation, Opacity Rather than Compatibility

This article has argued that contemporary digital power cannot be adequately explained through the concepts of surveillance, discipline, control, or ideological interpellation alone. These concepts are not obsolete; they remain indispensable historical and theoretical resources for understanding the Onopticon. Yet contemporary technological integration has produced a new qualitative threshold: the real-time, predictive and infrastructural imposition of the space of possibility.

The article's central contribution is to approach digital power not only through visibility, behavioural regulation, or code-based limitation, but through the technical organisation of conditions of possibility. The Onopticon makes visible how future possibilities are prepared infrastructurally before the subject acts.

Plato's distinction between truth and appearance, Aristotle's account of telos and polis, Kant's understanding of autonomy and the conditions of experience, and Marx's analyses of capital, machinery, real subsumption and general intellect must be re-read in the age of digital infrastructure. The Onopticon shows the stage at which capital binds not only labour, but the subject's space of possibility to its logic of valorisation and prediction. Gramscian hegemony must also be rethought as infrastructural common sense: readability, participation and technical compatibility begin to appear as natural conditions of everyday life. Hegelian recognition must be rethought in relation to technical authentication; Althusserian ideology as embedded in interface and protocol; Husserlian lifeworld as synthetically organised; and Heideggerian enframing, with Stieglerian technical pharmacology, as predictive infrastructural imposition.

The same argument is decisive against contemporary progressive technological paradigms. The enhanced human of transhumanism becomes, in the Onopticon, calculable Homovictimus. The accelerationist hope for speed serves the faster imposition of the space of possibility. The frictionless society of technological solutionism risks reducing the human to an optimisable variable. Democratic technological reformism remains insufficient where readability itself becomes a condition of existence.

The subject of the Onopticon is Homovictimus: a fragile agent compelled into calculability, yet still able to develop forms of resistance within that compulsion. The emphasis on victimhood must be retained, because this subject acts under conditions that are not equal or neutral. Its agency has been scored, authenticated, risk-assessed and limited by technical infrastructures.

The political horizon of this article is therefore not a regulatory programme. Instruments such as data minimisation, audit boards, algorithmic transparency, or impact assessment may be useful in practical contexts; but they cannot address the ontopolitical mutation of the Onopticon. If the conditions under which the world is experienced are infrastructurally imposed, the issue is not merely better governance. The issue is that the human must not be surrendered to the regime of calculability.

For this reason, the article ultimately returns to the **Right to Opacity**. Opacity is deeper than secrecy, more fundamental than privacy, and prior to technical compatibility. Older forms of power saw, called and disciplined the subject. The Onopticon constructs the space of possibility the subject encounters. Contemporary resistance therefore cannot mean only becoming invisible; it must mean remaining incalculable. It cannot mean only being protected from the system; it must mean refusing the system's claim to exhaust the human.

This is not an assertion of theoretical superiority over classical theories or the founding figures of progressive paradigms. The article does not diminish Marx, Hegel, Gramsci, Althusser, Husserl, or Heidegger. It shows instead how the world their concepts sought to explain is being rendered inoperative by digital infrastructures. In this sense, the Onopticon does not attack the founding figures; it protests the disappearance of the conditions of reality that made them historically possible.

Philosophy interpreted the world; politics attempted to change it. In the age of the Onopticon, the world appears before the subject as a set of possibilities already organised by technical infrastructures. The task today is not to regulate this imposition better, but to open an opaque, incalculable and irreducible line of existence against the claim to render the human subject entirely readable.

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